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Prospects and Problems*
C. Ford Runge
Distinguished McKnight  University Professor of Applied Economics and Law
Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy 
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Introduction
It might be supposed that a Global Environment Organization (GEO) is part of what Conquest
terms a “supranational world state,” for which the world is clearly not ready, and which he rightly
rejects as a “quick-fix idea.”1  However, despite serious difficulties, a GEO should be considered as a
possible step coordinating international environmental policy, whilst protecting and insulating the World
Trade Organization (WTO) from responsibilities for which it is both disinclined and unprepared.  The
GATT/WTO system itself, now with over half a century of history, has been attacked in much the same
terms as a GEO. Both Right and Left have decried the loss of national sovereignty to international
bodies.  Yet as Joseph Cobb of the Heritage Foundation noted, “The World Trade Organization will
expand the sovereignty of American citizens by reducing the power of interest groups to manipulate2Joseph Cobb. A Guide to the New GATT Agreement. Heritage Backgrounder Paper no.
985. May 5, 1994. Washington, DC. The Heritage Foundation (1994). Quoted in Daniel C. Esty.
Greening the GATT: Trade Environment and the Future.  Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 1994, p. 93.
3For a critique of the Seattle debacle in the context of food security, see C. Ford Runge and
Benjamin Senauer. “A Removable Feast.” Foreign Affairs (May-June 2000): 39-51.  For an
environmental critic’s view of Seattle see Henry Holmes “The World Trade Take-Over.” Earth Island
Journal 14: 4 (Winter 1999-2000): 38.
4See John Mickelthwait and Adrian Wooldridge. A Future Perfect: The Challenge and
Hidden Promise of Globalization. London: Heinemann, 2000.
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trade policy.”2 Similar remarks might apply to global environmental policy under a GEO.  At the failed
trade ministerial in Seattle at the end of 1999, strident criticisms were levied at the WTO, IMF and
World Bank, described as faceless international bureaucracies with programs harmful to the
environment.3  Although hostile to multilateral institutions, these criticisms beg the obvious question: if
not these institutions, then what others?4  While many criticisms of the global economy and global
institutions may have merit, it is hard to think of a future in which trade and global institutions, or issues
of the natural environment, will play little or no part.  Accordingly, the task is to redefine objectives in a
global economy, and to restructure institutions to meet these objectives.  
This paper is developed in this spirit, with a GEO as part of a global institutional restructuring. 
Such restructuring is necessary today at an international level, much as in the 1780s, the weaknesses of
the Articles of Confederation were increasingly apparent at the national level.  Madison, Hamilton and
Jay (writing as “Publius”) recognized the need to persuade others that the nation would not persevere
without substantial institutional innovations.  Max Beloff, writing in the introduction to The Federalist,
cautioned against American hubris, but recognized the broad relevance of the U.S. experience: 5Max Beloff (ed.). The Federalist: Or, the New Constitution, by Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison, and John Jay. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948, p. 1xvi.
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If Americans assume too readily that their own Constitution and the greatest of the
commentaries upon it, together provide the answer to all the unsolved political problems of the
world, there is their own history as well as that of other countries to make them 
cautious.  But the substitution of relativism and will for natural law and reason, does not so far
seem to have produced results which would justify the neglect of that school of thought which is
best represented in the Federalist.5  
A central element in this school of thought was that free and unfettered commerce should be
encouraged between states, coordinated by bodies which derived their authority from the consent of
the same states.  The concept of a GEO defended here has exactly such features, although the states
are nations.
This paper traces the evolution of the debate over a GEO, and analyzes its problems and
opportunities in the world trading system. It first considers the genesis of proposals for a GEO, and
provides a short historical account.  Second, it offers one view of what a GEO might entail. The next
two sections offer a brief summary of some of the main arguments for and against such a body.  The
fifth section discusses issues of implementation, and the relationship between a GEO and existing
institutions with environmental or trade responsibilities, such as UNEP and the WTO.  It also considers
whether a GEO should be built up incrementally, or whether a “grand stroke” would be more effective
in establishing it.  The sixth section takes up three related issues: the role of developing countries, issues
of subsidiarity and the effective use of sanctions or conditionality.  The seventh and final section offers a
summary and conclusion.6Daniel C. Esty. “The Value of Creating a Global Environmental Organization.”  Environment
Matters. Annual Review. Washington, DC. The World Bank. 2000.
7See, for examples Calestous, Juma. “The Perils of Centralizing Global Environmental
Governance.” Environmental Matters. Annual Review. Washington, DC. The World Bank. 2000.
8See G. Maggi. “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation.”
American Economic Review (March, 1999): 190-214.  K. Bagwell and R.W. Staiger. “An Economic
Theory of GATT.” American Economic Review (March, 1999): 215-248.  For a longer history of
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1.  Genesis of Proposals for a GEO
In the early 1990s, transnational environmental policy challenges first led to calls for a Global
Environmental Organization (GEO).  By 2000, support extended from French Prime Minister Jospin
and President Jacques Chirac to former WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero, the Economist
magazine, and others.6  Even so, many remain unconvinced of the need for yet another international
organization.7
The argument for a GEO arose primarily from trade policy participants who felt that the
GATT/WTO system was ill-equipped to respond when trade questions intersected with environmental
issues.  While sympathetic to stronger national environmental safeguards, they recognized that
governments required coordinated multilateral responses to transnational environmental issues, not only
when trade conflicts were apparent, but also where trade was largely unaffected.  Even if the
GATT/WTO system could be “greened,” they felt that international environmental challenges required
their own multilateral responses.  Just as the GATT/WTO system had evolved out of growing
commercial interdependence following World War II, and had helped to foster a set of rules by which
the trade game should be played, so growing ecological interconnections now created the need for a
set of global environmental rules.8  The parallelism of trading rules and environmental rules arose fromtrade-environment interactions, see Charles S. Pearson. Economics and the Global Environment.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 258-306.
9John Jackson. World Trade and the Law of GATT. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969. 
John Jackson. “World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?” Washington
and Lee Law Review 49: 4 (Fall, 1992): 1227-78.
10Herman E. Daly. “The Perils of Free Trade.” Scientific American 269: 5 (November, 1993):
50-57.
11J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan. “Trade and Environment: Does Environmental Diversity
Detract from the Case for Free Trade?,” in J. Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec (eds.), Fair Trade and
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol 1. Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT Press,
1997.  
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the fact that interdependent states could not cope with commercial or environmental challenges through
unilateral or ad hoc solutions.  A more stable and predictable system must be rule-based, 
although the coexistence of a set of multilateral trade and environmental rules would give rise to
questions of priority and consistency.9
The first calls for a GEO emerged from criticisms of the impacts of trade liberalization on the
natural environment in the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) during
1992 and 1993.  The early phases of this debate found traders and environmentalists in hostile camps
(where many remain).  Environmentalists, influenced by a number of critiques of expanded economic
growth on the natural environment, tended to equate trade, and thus growth, with pressures on natural
ecosystems.10  Traders, in contrast, focused on the potential role of environmental safeguards as non-
tariff barriers to trade, the inevitable differences across nations in environmental regimes, and the
necessity of income growth if environmental protection was to be afforded.11  In addition, a growing
number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEA’s) stimulated discussion of the need for12See discussion in C.Ford Runge(with Francois Orlalo-Magne and Philip Van de Kamp).
Freer Trade, Protected Environment: Balancing Trade Liberalization and Environmental
Interests. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994 and Gary Sampson. Trade,
Environment and the WTO: The Post-Seattle Agenda Overseas Development Council. Policy Essay
No. 27. Washington, DC, 2000, ch. 6.
13C. Ford Runge and Peter Emerson circulated a memo proposing an environmental protocol in
1991.  Emerson was the Environmental Defense Fund’s point man on NAFTA, and headed EDF’s
Austin office.  A similar proposal was circulated by Justin Ward, of the Natural Resources Defense
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enforcement mechanisms, some of which involved explicit trade sanctions.  This raised questions of
how, and whether, such MEAs should be granted exceptions to the principles of the GATT articles.12
The politics of NAFTA brought these interests into sharp conflict, especially over the
environmental degradation evident in factories along Mexico’s pre-NAFTA free trade zone with the
U.S.  NAFTA also brought into relief the North/South divide over environmental policy, with richer
Northern countries such as the U.S. and Canada calling for higher levels of transborder environmental
protection. LDCs such as Mexico perceived other motives in these calls, including old-fashioned
protectionism disguised as “environmental conditionality.”  Many LDCs remain convinced that Northern
environmental restrictions will serve as nontariff barriers to market access, or will condition such access
on developing countries adherence to costly environmental measures.  
In the volatile political atmosphere of the 1992 Presidential election, many Democrats were
critical of NAFTA, while most Republican supporters attempted to protect the agreement from
environmental criticisms or labor opposition.  Given this political dilemma, a small number of scholars
and a few environmental organizations saw an opportunity for linkage between trade and environment,
proposing that an “environmental protocol” be attached to the NAFTA treaty to safeguard and support
environmental initiatives, especially in the U.S./Mexico border region.13  Such a protocol could reassureCouncil (NRDC) in Washington, D.C.  Other groups, such as the Center for International
Environmental Law (CIEL), the National Wildlife Federation, and Sierra Club were actively involved in
debating whether a side-agreement could justify support for NAFTA.
14For a comprehensive history and assessment see Pierre Marc Johnson and André Beaulieu.
The Environment and NAFTA: Understanding and Implementing the New Continental Law.
Island Press. 1996.  See also Steve Charnovitz. “NAFTA: An Analysis of its Environmental
Provisions.” Environmental Law Reporter 23: 2 (1993): 10067-10073.
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NAFTA’s environmental critics while preserving the gains from trade in the agreement itself. This
proposal rapidly evolved into an environmental “side-agreement” (one of three ultimate side-agreements
to NAFTA). Candidate Clinton, seeking a way to square pro-NAFTA and pro-environment positions,
gave his support.  While the government of Mexico regarded the side-agreement with considerable
anxiety, their larger interest in expanded trade with a U.S. economy 25 times the size of Mexico’s
caused them, after intense negotiations, to agree to its basic provisions.  Despite fears of “protectionism
in green disguise” and threats to its sovereignty, the promise of substantially expanded access by
Mexico to the markets of the U.S. and Canada ultimately proved too great a prize to reject the side-
agreement.
The provisions of the side agreement evolved from the environmental guarantees given by
President George Bush in May 1991 in order to gain renewed fast-track negotiating authority for
NAFTA and the GATT Round.  On September 16, 1992, the environment ministers of Canada,
Mexico and the U.S. initiated a new round of negotiations directed at creating a trilateral North
American environmental council.  From April of 1993 until August 13, 1993, negotiations continued,
leading to a signed side-agreement to the NAFTA text, the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) on September 13, 1993.1415Among the dedicated opponents were Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen, the Sierra Club, the Fair
Trade Campaign, and Greenpeace.  Environmental supporters included the Environmental Defense
Fund (now Environmental Defense), the Natural Resources Defense Council, Conservation
International, the National Wildlife Federation, National Audubon Society and World Wildlife Fund.
16Johnson and Beaulieu, 1996, p. 128.  The NAAEC was created under U.S. Executive Order
12915 of 13 May, 1994.
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With the successful negotiation of the environmental side agreement, a number of key
environmental organizations threw their support to NAFTA, although a number continued to oppose it,
some vociferously.15  In the end, pro-NAFTA environmental groups helped garner sufficient support
from Democratic members of Congress to ensure NAFTA’s eventual passage.  On November 17,
1993, NAFTA was ratified by the U.S. Congress, together with provisions that would create the North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), and signed by President Clinton on
December 8, 1993.
The specific linkages from the side-agreement’s NAAEC to the main NAFTA text (from which
it remained separate), are worth noting in relation to the larger issues surrounding a GEO and world
trade rules.  The centerpiece of NAAEC was the creation of the North American Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (CEC), overseen by a small Secretariat headquartered in Montreal, with a
budget of U.S. $9 million–smaller than many academic departments.  Despite its small size, its mandate
extended beyond the trade effects of NAFTA on the environment, to include an array of transborder
ecological issues.  It also provided for a dispute settlement mechanism for environmental questions. 
From a legal perspective, NAAEC and the CEC derived from an executive agreement, which “steers
clear of the normative realm and concerns itself with things institutional, primarily because it is the
product of an intergovernmental process between entities that each want to set their own standards.”16 17Ibid. p. 130.
18See David Vogel. Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulations in a Global
Economy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
19See Runge, 1994.
20United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. No. DS21/R, 3 September
1991.  This US action was challenged by Mexico and several other GATT contracting parties as an
unwarranted reach into the commerce of the embargoed nations, or “extrajurisdictionality.”  In the first
case (Tuna-Dolphin I), neither the United States nor Mexico asked the GATT Council to adopt the
9
It was largely detached from the NAFTA agreement, seeking to achieve its goals primarily through new
institutions to foster environmental cooperation and new environmental obligations.17
The dynamics leading to the NAFTA environmental side-agreement illustrated the double-
edged nature of trade/environment linkages.  On the one hand, the creation of the NAAEC and CEC
showed that an implicit bargain is reachable between rich Northern states and LDCs such as Mexico, in
which environmental commitments are made by LDCs in return for expanded market access to the
North.  This process has been described as a win-win outcome for both trade and the environment.18 
But it also underscored the point that LDCs are generally unwilling and unable to make such
commitments in the absence of the kind of growth in income which trade can bring.19  Unfortunately, the
same logic can be interpreted as a form of environmental conditionality, in which the engine of trade is
hooked to environmental requirements which LDCs might well prefer to avoid.  In the so-called “Tuna-
Dolphin” dispute between the U.S., Mexico and other LDCs, for example, an embargo on dolphin-
unsafe tuna was seen as a bald attempt by U.S. interests (including the U.S. fishing fleet) to close off
market access until Mexico and other countries stopped the use of dolphin-unsafe (and lower cost)
fishing gear.20  How trade/environment linkages are designed will thus effect their reception as eitherdecision, which found the United States in violation of the GATT Articles, in part because delicate
NAFTA negotiations were underway.  Subsequently, the Europena Economic Community requested a
second dispute resolution panel (Tuna-Dolphin II) to review again the US restrictions on tuna imports
from countries failing to meet provisions of the US Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).  On 20
May 1994, the panel found that the US embargo violated GATT prohibitions on quantitative
restrictions and did not fall under any of the exceptions to the GATT’s general obligations.  However,
as some environmental commentators noted, there are “significant differences between the analytical
paths taken in the two decisions” (CIEL, 1994).  Similar issues of “extrajurisdictionality” arose
prominently in the Shrimp-turtle case, in which the United States banned the importation of shrimp and
shrimp products from countries found to be in violation of Section 609 of US Public Law 101-162,
which authorizes such bans if sea turtles are caught and adversely affected incidental to shrimp fishing. 
In a report of a panel formed under challenge to the US action, the ban was found in violation of Art.
XI:I of the GATT, and was not justified as an exception under Art. XX.  The WTO Appellate Body
reversed the finding concerning the application of Art. XX, and found that Art. XX(g), “relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources,” did in fact apply, but that the US measure nonetheless
failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau to Art. XX.
21See C. Ford Runge. “A Conceptual Framework for Agricultural Trade and the
Environment–Beyond the ‘Green Box.’” Journal of World Trade 33: 6(Dec. 1999): 47-68.
10
win-win outcomes, or as economic leverage to wrest environmental or trade concessions.21
2. The Proposal: One View
One of the chief architects of the NAFTA environmental side agreement was Daniel Esty, who
served under President George H. W. Bush’s Administrator to EPA, William Rielly.  After leaving the
government, Esty wrote Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future (1994), which
developed the argument for a GEO.  At the same time, Freer Trade, Protected Environment:
Balancing Trade Liberalization and Environmental Interests (1994) was published by the Council
on Foreign Relations in New York, based on the work of the Council’s Study Group on Trade and the
Environment.  In it, C. Ford Runge developed a case similar to Esty’s, arguing that the CEC and
NAFTA side-agreement could be generalized from a trilateral to a multilateral environmental22Other early advocates of a GEO were Steve Charnovitz and Jeffrey Dunoff, who suggested
modeling it on the International Labor Organization (ILO), as well as Geoffrey Palmer.  See Steve
Charnovitz, “The Environment versus Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate.” Environmental Law 23
(1993): 511-517. Jeffrey Dunoff, “International Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ, and Trade-Environment
Disputes.” Michigan Journal of International Law 15 (1994): 1043-1127.  Geoffrey Palmer, “New
Ways to Make International Environmental Law.” American Journal of International Law 86 (April,
1992): 259-283.  See also Daniel C. Esty. “GATTing the Greens,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5
(Nov/Dec, 1993): 132-36.  More recently see John Whalley and Ben Zissimos. “A World
Environmental Organization?” mimeo.  University of Western Ontario, University of Warwick and
National Bureau of Economic Research. October, 2000 and Frank Biermann. “The Case for a World
Environmental Organization.” Environment 42: 9 (November, 2000): 23-31.
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secretariat.  Such a body would function separately from, but in tandem with, the World Trade
Organization (WTO).22 
The basic design of a GEO advanced by Runge (1994) was composed of a Secretariat and a
Multilateral Commission on Environment (MACE).  The Secretariat would be the formal, ministerial-
level body of government representatives, meeting periodically to affirm certain policies.  The
Commission would be a policy oriented group of environmental experts drawn from NGOs, academia,
business and government.  (See Appendix Figure 1).  While the representatives to the GEO Secretariat
would, like WTO representatives, be government officials, expert environmental and business
involvement was also proposed, similar to the International Labor Organization (ILO), via the
Commission.  The Commission would thus be composed of a standing group of environmental experts,
government and business representatives from all member counties.  Its meetings would be open to the
public, and would allow worldwide access to the data and analysis underlying its work.  The primary
focus of this work would be to propose ways to “harmonize up” national environmental standards,
while carefully considering the technical issues and problems of this process for developing countries. 23The Global Environmental Facility was launched in 1991 as a three-year pilot program to
allow for actions where no international agreement had yet been negotiated.  It is jointly managed by the
World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the United Nations Development
Programme.  Its role was further elaborated at the 1992 Rio Conference, and it has complex links to
the Biodiveristy and Climate Conventions, as well as to the Montreal Protocol.  Its further role is,
however, is still the subject of debate among all of the organizations involved.  See Kenneth Piddington,
“The Role of the World Bank,” in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, (eds.), The Institutional
Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests and Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, pp.
212-227.
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The GEO Commission would issue regular reports and related documents proposing improved policies,
identifying environmental “hot spots,” and recommending special projects for national governments. 
This process would allow for public comments from any group, governmental or nongovernmental.  The
effect would be to open the GEO Commission to full public participation and review.
The GEO and its Commission would work closely with the World Bank (IBRD) and other
multilateral lending agencies, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
and the Inter-American Bank (BID), as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to develop
funding for environmental projects to upgrade national infrastructure, especially for waste water
treatment, sanitation, and hazardous waste disposal.  National governments would be encouraged to
establish an initial tranche of $10 billion for these purposes to operate on a revolving basis through the
Global Environmental Facility.23  This funding would focus primarily on projects in developing countries
in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where national
resources for environmental improvements are most scarce.
The GEO would also work jointly with the WTO and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to identify trade measures that threaten environmental quality,24For a discussion of the role of the UN agencies in global environmental affairs, see Peter S.
Thacher, “The Role of the United Nations,” in Hurrell and Kingsbury, International Politics, pp. 183-
211.  A cautionary note on the need for new institutions in the context of NAFTA is given in Stephen P.
Mumme, “New Directions in United States-Mexican Transboundary Environmental Management: A
Critique of Current Proposals,” Natural Resources Journal, vol. 31 (summer 1992): 539-562. The
range of supporters for a GEO has nonetheless continued to expand.  See note 22 above.
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and to develop environmental policies that are least burdensome to trade expansion.  It could also serve
as a general “chapeau” for the growing number of multilateral environmental agreements, such as the
Montreal Protocol, just as the ILO serves as an umbrella over a large number of special labor
agreements and arrangements.  The overall effect would be to relieve the WTO of major institutional
demands to accommodate a “green agenda.”  Since the WTO is not an environmental organization, and
should not become one, a well-engineered GEO would reduce pressure to “reform GATT,” which
would be diverted constructively into the development of instruments directly aimed at environmental
targets. In cases in which trade burdens due to environmental policies came before WTO dispute
settlement panels, the GEO Commission would utilize its expertise to offer evidence, analysis, and
proposed alternatives to the policies in dispute.  In addition the GEO could have its own dispute
resolution procedures, to be discussed in greater detail below.
While a highly elaborated plan will require a great deal of analysis and consultation, it is well to
ask whether such an organization is really needed, in light of the UNEP and related work by
development agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme and the Commission on
Sustainable Development created as a result of the 1992 Rio Conference.  While supplementing and
drawing on the work of these groups, knowledgeable observers and participants still support a GEO.24 
The late Elliot Richardson argued forcefully in the context of climate change for a permanent25Richardson’s analysis and call for a Multilateral Environmental Agency was developed in the
context of climate change, although the arguments he advanced are general ones.  See Elliot L.
Richardson, “Climate Change: Problems of Law-Making,” in Hurrell and Kingsbury, International
Politics, pp. 166-182.
26Richardson, “Climate Change,” pp. 176-177.
27Lawrence Susskind and Connie Ozawa, “Negotiating More Effective International
Environmental Agreements,” in Hurrell and Kingsbury, International Politics, pp. 110-141.  See also
Scott Barrett, “International Agreements for the Protection of Environmental and Agricultural
Resources: An Economics Perspective.” London: London Business School, 1992.
14
environmental multilateral body, whether a “beefed-up UNEP” or an entity patterned on the WTO,
noting that “it may not make a crucial difference whether an old agency is given new duties or a new
one is brought into existence.”25  As Richardson argued, a GEO:
. . . Would create substantial incentives for member states to improve their environmental
performance.  Nongovernmental organizations would be watching, exhorting and pushing. 
Domestic awareness of the national effort would be heightened by the international attention it
attracted.  Media coverage would be correspondingly intensified.  The attention thereby
focused on the government’s response would generate pressure to raise its level.  It is arguable,
indeed, that the self-reinforcing process thus set in motion could become a formidable substitute
for official action–more effective than regulation and far less expensive than its enforcement.  If
this happens, what has generally been called “soft law” will become progressively harder.26
The linking of the environmental activities of a GEO to market access and trade reform in the
WTO, the OECD, and the multilateral lending agencies would create additional incentives for LDCs to
support it.  Susskind and Ozawa have noted that “environmental negotiations, up to now, have been
conducted largely in isolation from negotiations on other international issues such as debt, trade, or
security.”  Linking these issues properly can enhance the potential for mutual gains, since “the goal of a
well-structured negotiation is not to encourage compromise but to find ways of ensuring that all parties
will be better off if they cooperate.”27  How such linkage occurs is important, and will be considered in28See note 20 above.
29See Gary P. Sampson. Trade, Environment and the WTO: The Post-Seattle Agenda. 
Overseas Development Council.  Policy Essay No. 27. Washington, D.C. 2000. pp. 26-29. Shaffer
(2001) emphasizes that the motivation behind the CTE was not simply pressure from groups concerned
over the environmental impacts of trade but primarily fears by WTO members, especially LDCs, over
the growing number of environmental regulations with potential trade effects.  From the point of view of
trade ministers the latter dominated the former.  See Gregory C. Shaffer. “The World Trade
Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade
and Environment Matters.”  Harvard Environmental Law Journal forthcoming (all citations of pages
are to the manuscript version).
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the sections to follow. 
3. The Arguments in Favor
The argument for a GEO was thus built around a number of common themes.  The first was that
the GATT/WTO institutions were unable and largely unwilling to shoulder major environmental
responsibilities in conflicts between trade and the environment. This argument has been supported by
developments inside the WTO throughout the 1990s.  The WTO, concerned over the use of
environmental measures as trade barriers, had been stung by criticisms from environmentalists of
various WTO rulings, notably the “Tuna-Dolphin” and “Shrimp-Turtle” cases.28  Concerned that it
show some response to environmental critics, the WTO General Council created a Committee on
Trade and the Environment (CTE) in 1995. The CTE was set up to follow the recommendations of the
Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment adopted in 1994 in Marakesh.29  While defenders of
the CTE claimed that it demonstrated the “greening” of the WTO, it faced a barrage of criticism after30Steve Charnovitz.  “A Critical Guide to the WTO’s Report on Trade and the Environment.”
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 14: 2 (1997): 341-378.
31Sampson, p. 27.
32Sampson, p. 27-28.
33Even in such cases, the WTO is wary of an explicit environmental role.  In the famous
Shrimp-Turtle dispute, the appellate body of the WTO ruled that U.S. should have sought an
international environmental agreement to deal with fishing practices, rather than bringing the matter
before the trade body as a result of a trade embargo.  See Sampson 2000, p. 83 and fn 7, p. 98.
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release of its heavily negotiated report to Ministers in Singapore in December, 1996.30  It had, critics
argued, failed to recommend modifications in multilateral trade rules “to enhance a positive interaction
between trade and environmental measures . . .”31  It was precisely the unwillingness of trade ministers
to redefine trade rules for environmental ends that revealed their essentially (and understandably)
conservative posture.  Sampson argues that the Singapore report of CTE shows how wary  trade
officials are of entering into environmental policy.  Instead, those who have the appropriate
environmental expertise – both nationally and internationally–should play a larger role. However, this
begs the question of how they should play such a role.  
In general, the CTE’s limited terms of reference clearly indicated an unwillingness by the WTO
to venture too far into the environmental domain.  As Sampson notes: “WTO members do not want a
role in environmental policymaking and enforcement, nor do they take lightly changing rules that could
give them this role.”32  In short, the members of the WTO and its secretariat in Geneva have not been
enthusiastic about assuming added responsibilities for the environment.  Only in those cases in which
trade is explicitly affected by environmental measures is the WTO likely to become engaged.33 
Moreover, many environmentalists mistrust the capacity and willingness of WTO panels or trade34Esty (1994, p. 80) refers to this gap in terms of a “lack of parallelism” between trade and
environmental institutions at the international level and as an asymmetry in the rules of trade versus those
for environment, under the general heading of “institutional imbalance.” 
35See Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern. Global Public Goods: International
Cooperation for the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.  Todd Sandler,
Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political and Economic Problems. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
36See Oran Young. The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal
Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.
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ministries to give sufficient weight to environmental concerns.  This leaves a substantial institutional gap
both in terms of trade-related environmental measures, and transnational environmental issues posing
global challenges of policy coordination which can only be filled by a separate body such as a GEO.34 
A second argument in favor of a GEO concerns these transnational challenges, which are often
described as “global public goods,” and which may or may not have direct linkages to trade.35  Issues
such as atmospheric ozone pollution, degradation and loss of plant genetic resources, transboundary
shipments of hazardous wastes, and threats to endangered animal and plant species are all examples of
such problems.  Because they respect no national boundaries, their solution requires joint participation
and commitments by sovereign states.  Absent a “global Leviathan,” agreements must be reached which
call upon each affected country in the “global commons” to adopt policies that contribute to a general
solution.36  Thusfar, the mode adopted most often is a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA),
such as the Montreal Protocol respecting atmospheric ozone (1989), the Cartagena Protocol (2000)
respecting biosafety and plant genetic modification, the CITES agreement (1972) respecting
endangered species and the Basel Convention (1992) respecting hazardous wastes.  
Each of these MEAs has important provisions which raises questions over its compatibility with37Sampson (2000) note 5, p. 98, citing Donald M. Goldbery, et al. Effectiveness of Trade
and Positive Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Lessons from the Montreal
Protocol. Washington: CIEL, 1998.  Dale Andrews. Experiences in the Use of Trade Measures in
CITES. Joint Session of Trade and Environmental Experts.  OECD/GD (97) 106.  Paris: OECD,
1997.  Jonathan Kreuger.  The Basel Convention and Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes.  Briefing Paper No. 45.  Royal Institute of International Affairs.  London, May 1998.
38See United Nations Environment Programme. Register of Treaties and Other Agreements
in the Field of the Environment. Nairobi, 1991 and UNEP. Environment and Trade: A Handbook.
International Institute for Sustainable Development.  Winnipeg, Canada, 2000.  See also Andrew
Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.). The International Politics of the Environment: Actors,
Interests, and Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 10. n. 20.
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international trade rules.  The Montreal Protocol, with 161 signatories, requires bans or phase-outs on
any production of ozone-depleting substances, including chlorofluorocarbons.  Signatories are
prohibited from trading in these products with any non-signatory that cannot prove that it otherwise
meets the requirements of the protocol.  The Cartagena Protocol respecting biosafety created an
informed agreement procedure for importing or exporting living organisms that have been genetically
modified, allowing countries to restrict market access to these products.  The Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), with 132 signatories, bans trade in either live
endangered species or the parts of dead ones.  The Basel Convention, with 113 signatories, imposes
bans on trade in hazardous wastes for final disposal between OECD countries and non-OECD
countries.37 The UNEP’s Register lists more than 200 multilateral agreements (including protocols and
amendments) on environmental issues.38  While the four cited above are perhaps most salient in respect
to trade restrictions, many others have the potential to run afoul of WTO rules.  While it is arguable that
such MEA’s are an adequate response to these environmental problems, two fundamental questions
arise.  First, should the MEA’ s themselves somehow fall outside the trade disciplines of the39For an early treatment, see Steve Charnovitz, “Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in
GATT Article XX.” Journal of World Trade 25 (October, 1991): 37-55.
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GATT/WTO system, or (especially when they involve explicit trade measures or sanctions) are they in
fact in violation of the principles of free trade?  Second, can the hundreds of existing MEA’s, and the
scores which can be anticipated in the coming decades, be adequately managed without creating an
institutional umbrella to help oversee the linkages among and between them, and their potential conflicts
with WTO rules?
The first question relates primarily to the scope and application of the “exceptions clause,” or
GATT Article XX.39  A subsection (Article XX (g)) allows for agreements concerned with the
“conservation of exhaustible natural resources” to be treated as an exception to the general
GATT/WTO principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity “if such measures are made in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”  If this or other subsections of Article XX,
such as those related to “human, animal or plant life or health” in Article XX(b), are interpreted broadly
to apply to most MEAs, then actions undertaken to protect the environment may distort trade and still
be allowed so long as they are “necessary” (i.e. alternative measures are not available or practicable). 
But this broad interpretation of Article XX, supported by many environmentalists as one form of
“environmental window,” is viewed with extreme apprehension in trade circles.  Such a wide window
invites the use of MEA’s as non-tariff barriers to trade, and a slippery slope toward environmental
protectionism rather than environmental protection.  These concerns have been advanced, for example,
in relation to the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on biosafety and genetically modified (GM) plants, which
seems to allow for trade restrictions on the basis of wide application of the somewhat ill-defined40See C. Ford Runge and Lee Ann Jackson. “Labeling, Trade and Genetically Modified
Organisms: A Proposed Solution.” Journal of World Trade 33 (6): 2000: 111-122.
41See Sampson, 2000, pp. 95-97.
42See for example, the U.S./Canada dispute over salmon and herring catch and count limits.  In
this case, Canada demanded that U.S. salmon and herring boats land and have their catch fully counted
in Canada before proceeding to canneries and further processing.  The United States argued that this
policy was not necessary to conserve exhaustible natural resources under Article XX(g), as claimed by
Canada, and was an unjustified burden on the commercial conduct of the U.S. fisheries industry.  After
a series of disputes, settlement panels heard the case (under both the U.S.–Canada Free Trade
Agreement and the GATT/WTO process), and the U.S. position was upheld.  This case illustrated a
clear line of reasoning from a finding of trade burden to a lack of justification for the burden in terms of
environmental protection. For a discussion, see Runge, 1994, pp. 80-87.
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“precautionary principle.”40
A more conservative approach, creating a case-by-case environmental window, would be to
provide for waivers to WTO rules for some MEA’s, renewable over regular time intervals.41  Such
waivers would require a supporting vote by three-quarters of the WTO Contracting Parties.  However,
the presumption that trade ministers should vet each MEA would seem to place them in regular and
recurring judgement of environmental policy measures, a position which they have said they prefer to
avoid.
In practice, the WTO has been very gingerly in granting exceptions to environmental measures
under Article XX, since many of the cases brought involve questionable efforts to masquerade
protectionism as conservation.42  In general, the right to invoke an exception has been granted only if it
applies within the country taking the action, and not if it involves measures that reach into other
countries, such as embargoes or border restrictions.  This, of course, fails to answer the important
question: what if MEA’s must have such extrajurisdictional 43Other possible “environmental windows” have been explored in various WTO cases.  For
example, another justification for environmental measures appears in the chapeau, or headnote, to
Article XX, relating to “unjustifiable discrimination” or a “disguised restriction” on international trade. 
These justifications have been developed in light of recent cases before the Appellate Body of the
WTO, notably the Reformulated Gasoline cases, in which a U.S. claim that a discriminatory regulation
had been enacted for a bona fide regulatory purpose was rejected because the United States had
alternative measures available that could have accomplished the regulatory objective without employing
discrimination.  When the discriminatory element of a regulation is found to be unnecessary to the policy
objective it is meant to serve, that measure can be classified as “unjustified discrimination” or a
“disguised restriction” to international trade (Hudec, 1998, p. 638).  The issue also arose in the
Shrimp-Turtle case (see note 20 above).  Yet another basis for justifying environmental measures
derives from Article 2.2 of the 1994 Standards Code, which discusses “unnecessary obstacles” to
trade.  Although the WTO dispute settlement system has not rendered any decisions applying the
Article, it appears to be especially useful in relation to measures that are neutral on their face (or “origin
neutral”) but in which de facto discrimination is alleged, in contract to de jure discrimination, which
could be handled more readily under Article XX (Hudec, 1998, p. 644).  A final basis for justifying
environmental measures related to food quality and health risks in the food system, of especial
relevance to new issues of biotechnology and genetically modified organisms, is the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement made in the Uruguay Round.  The SPS Agreement is itself an
explication of Article XX(b).  Controversy currently surrounds the application of the SPS Agreement to
the risks that may be posed by genetically modified (GM) foods, and whether measures designed to
ban imports of GM products can be justified by demonstrating that they might promote plant or insect
pests, antibiotic resistance, or other threats to human, animal or plant life or health.  See Michael
Trebilcock and Julie Soloway.  “International Trade Policy and Domestic Food Safety Regulations: The
Case for Substantial Deference by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Under the SPS Agreement.”
Paper Presented at the Conference, The Political Economy of International Trade.  University of
Minnesota, September 15-16, 2000.
21
reach in order to respond to transboundary environmental challenges?43
The second question, related to the first, concerns the arguable need for an umbrella
organization overarching the proliferating number of MEA’s.  As noted in the previous section, a GEO
secretariat, comparable to the WTO secretariat in Geneva, would offer such a “chapeau.”  It could help
to coordinate disparate environmental efforts and MEA’s, and function as a go-between and buffer
relating MEA’s or other environmental policies to the GATT/WTO system.  One function, for example,44See C. Ford Runge. “A Conceptual Framework for Agricultural Trade and the Environment:
Beyond the ‘Green Box’.” Journal of World Trade 33: 6 (December, 1999): 58-63.
45Kym Anderson. “The Standard Welfare Economics of Policies Affecting Trade and the
Environment.” in K. Anderson and Richar Blackhurst (eds.). The Greening of World Trade Issues.
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could be to help design MEA’s (and national environmental programs) with minimal trade–distorting
effects, and to help advance market-based environmental initiatives such as trading schemes.  When
obvious conflicts with GATT/WTO rules arose, a GEO could help to prepare sound arguments in favor
either of an Article XX exception, based on the necessity of trade measures in an MEA, a waiver if
deemed appropriate or some other GATT-legal “window” allowing an exception for the environmental
measure.  An even more significant function might be the consolidation of claims made under myriad
environmental agreements into a unified dispute settlement process, in which NGOs and other
interested parties could participate.
A third argument in favor of GEO arises from the need for exactly this kind of independent
authority in international environmental policy making.  In many circles, this has been termed the “targets
and instruments” issue.44  A principle of economic planning developed by economist Jan Tinbergen
(1950) is that in general each target of policy merits a separate instrument.  This principle can be
interpreted to mean that environmental targets are generally best met first by environmental policies, and
trade targets by trade policies.  If an appropriately balanced combination of environmental and trade
policy measures is found, the result can be gains both from the trade reforms and from improvements in
the level of environmental quality.  In general, therefore, some combination of trade and environmental
policies will be most efficient.  Conversely, the advantages of trade policy reform can be lost if
appropriate environmental actions are not undertaken jointly.45  New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1992.  Kerry Krutilla. “Environmental Regulation in an Open
Economy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20 (1991): 127-42.
46Grant Hauer and C. Ford Runge. “Trade-Environment Linkages in the Resolution of
Transboundary Externalities.” The World Economy 22: 1 (January, 1999): 25-39.
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Precisely because an independent entity such as GEO is lacking, a greater temptation exists to
use trade measures to enforce environmental obligations, violating the targets and instruments principle
and threatening the world trading system.  Trade interests may condemn the use of such measures for
environmental goals (such as dolphin safe tuna), but in the absence of effective multilateral
environmental rules and an overarching entity such as the GEO, environmentalists will claim that they
have no recourse.  Here it is useful to remember that by structuring a separate institutional entity in the
form of the NAAEC and the CEC, Canada, Mexico and the U.S. were honoring the principle of
separate instruments and attempting to disentangle environmental from trade politics.
It is naive to imagine that these two realms of policy can be entirely disjoint, but the creation of
a GEO would assist in separating many issues that do not need to be in conflict.  However, the weaker
the perceived ability of environmental groups to influence international policies, the greater their
incentive to use “linkage” destructively: to threaten the trading system  in order to gain environmental
concessions.46  By drawing environmental expertise and energy into the functioning of a GEO, the
GATT/WTO system would be largely left to pursue its own trade agenda, mindful of environmental
concerns, and in cooperation with a GEO secretariat, but not as a functioning “green” trading body.
Together, the three arguments described above constitute the core rational for a GEO.  They
are: (1) the unwillingness and inappropriateness of the GATT/WTO system as a center for transnational
environmental expertise and activity; (2) the widespread number of environmental issues which are47In a brief opposed to a GEO, Calestous Juma (2000) asserts that Esty’s arguments in favor
revolve around “administrative efficiency” claims.  A careful reading of Esty’s 1994 volume, and the
arguments developed here suggests that administrative efficiency, even if improved by a GEO, is not a
central argument in its favor, especially in light of the struggles it would face from existing UN agencies.
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inherently multilateral due of their scale and multiple jurisdictions, making them “global public goods”
which cannot be adequately managed through existing agencies or ever-proliferating and uncoordinated
MEA’s; and (3) the logical necessity of separate institutional authority for what are substantively
separate environmental problems, which pose a set of targets for policy that require their own
instruments at an international level.47
4.  The Arguments Against
The arguments against a GEO may be grouped around three main claims.  The first is that it is
unnecessary–that existing institutions, suitably augmented, are adequate to respond to transnational
environmental challenges. The second is that it is unwieldy–another international bureaucracy which may
prove just as unresponsive as existing ones to the concerns and interests of member states and may
actually challenge their sovereignty over national environmental issues.  The third, and most potent, is
that its creation would reflect the same “rich man’s club” priorities which, in the view of many LDCs,
have dominated the GATT/WTO system, tilting its functioning toward priorities of the North rather than
the South.
The first of these claims is that the panoply of existing UN agencies, NGOs and MEAs together
constitute a sufficient response to transboundary environmental issues.  These include the UN
Environment Programme (UNEP) the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the48See John Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds) Constructing World Culture: International
Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875. 1999. Cited in Schaffer, 2000, note 13. See Barbara
J. Bramble and Gareth Porter, “Non-Governmental Organizations and the Making of U.S. International
Environmental Policy,” in Hurrell and Kingsbury, International Politics, pp. 313-353.  See also
Nancy Lindboug, “Non-Governmental Organizations: Their Past, Present and Future Role in
International Environmental Negotiations,” in Lawrence E. Susskind, Eric Jay Dolin, and J. William
Breslin, eds., International Environmental Treaty Making (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Program on Negotiation Books, 1992).  Daniel C. Esty. “Non Governmental Organizations at the
World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition or Exclusion.” Journal of International
Economic Law 12: 3 (1998): 135-37.  For a more critical evaluation of the role of NGOs, see Peter
Spiro “New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the ‘Unregulated’ Marketplace.”
Cardozo Law Review 18: 3 (1996): 957-969.
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hundreds of MEAs noted above.  Others include the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the
World Bank, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the Global Environmental Facility
(GEF).  In addition, a growing number of NGOs, such as the World Resources Institute (WRI) in
Washington, D.C., the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the Center for International Environmental
Law (CIEL) have become active participants in the trade/environment agenda.48  Juma (2000) notes
that because of the diversity of environmental problems, specialized institutional responses are often
required, reflected in the MEAs and other agreements that deal with these questions issue by issue. 
While coordination may be desirable, “centralization” is not.  
The second claim leveled at a GEO is that it is likely to be an unwieldy and unresponsive
international bureaucracy which simply adds another layer to the many and diverse responses to global
environmental problems noted above.  Below the surface of this argument are GEO opponents who are
relatively comfortable with their influence over existing institutions, and who fear that they would lose
this influence in a new body.  These groups include not just bureaucrats at bodies such as UNEP, but
state agencies and NGOs as well.  It is arguable that member states of any multilateral body, as well as49See Shaffer, 2001, op. cit. note 23.
50See for example, “Administration Unclear on Policy for WTO Environment Committee.”
Inside U.S. Trade Jan. 26, 1996 for a discussion of internal dissention over goals and responsibilities in
the CTE.
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stakeholders such as environmental NGOs, seek to capture it for their own purposes.  Such
investments in capture, once made, are defended against new and uncertain prospects.49 A GEO that is
less subject to capture, and therefore “unresponsive,” is also less subject to special interests.  By
increasing the scope for coordinated approaches to global environmental issues, a GEO may reduce
opportunities for exercising such influence, and thus arouse concerted opposition from defenders of the
status quo.
A related issue concerns the many national agencies and ministries to which existing MEAs and
agreements are tied back.  At an administrative level, the authority for various aspects of international
environmental policymaking emanates from these different parts of national governments.  In the United
States, while the Executive Office of the President is ultimately responsible, duties for international
environmental policy are parceled out across a large number of executive agencies, from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(part of the Department of Commerce), the State Department, Department of Energy, Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, and Department of Agriculture among others.  Each agency will defend its
role in status quo agreements against any “coordination” that diminishes it.50
The third and most potent forces arrayed against a GEO are developing countries convinced
that it may force Northern priorities on Southern interests.  These include not only environmental goals
regarded as lower priorities in LDCs, but trade protection in “green” disguise.   As Juma (2000, p. 15)51Shaffer, 2001, p. 10.
52Shaffer, 2001, p. 14.
53Shaffer, 2001, p. 21.
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notes, “many developing countries are concerned that a new environmental agency would only become
another source of conditions and sanctions.”  These concerns were amply revealed in the WTO’s
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE).  In opposing even the formation of the CTE, spokesmen
for ASEAN such as Thailand, and other LDC representatives from Morocco, Tanzania and Egypt all
questioned the need for it. Shaffer (2001) notes that none of them wanted “to be pressured into signing
an environmental side agreement analogous to NAFTA’s.”51  When the CTE agenda was finally settled,
it reflected a variety of issues of direct concern to LDCs, notably a cluster of issues that linked LDC
environmental initiatives to the achievement of expanded access to Northern markets.52  
However, even these concessions did little to assuage nervousness by LDCs concerning the
possible growth of environmental conditionality.  Of particular concern was the widespread sense that
environmental demands would join similar demands by labor interests in the North to justify shutting off
LDC’s market access, a view reinforced by the political alliances struck between greens and labor on
display during the trade protests in Seattle in late 1999.  Discussing the idea of opening the Article XX
exceptions to broaden allowances for environmental measures, for example, Brazil’s Deputy Permanent
Representative to the WTO stated in 1998 that “We [developing countries] cannot be in favor of a
change in Article XX.  We think that this would create an imbalance in terms of a whole set of
disciplines and commitments and would set a precedent for other issues.”  As Shaffer notes, the other
issues he had in mind were trade restrictions based on ‘unfair’ labor standards.53  It is particularly54Interview with Ricardo Barba, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO from Mexico,
quoted in Shaffer, 2001, p. 26.
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noteworthy that Mexico, after acceding to the NAFTA environmental side agreement with the U.S. and
Canada, led the opposition to many U.S. proposals in the CTE.  When the U.S. delegation questioned
whether Mexico’s representatives to the CTE were speaking for the Mexican government, Mexico City
quickly confirmed that these opposing views were indeed official positions.54
In summary, three major claims raise questions over the possibility of successfully launching a
GEO.  These are (1) that existing bodies and agreements respecting international environmental issues
are adequate, and do not require a centralized overarching entity; (2) that a GEO would, in any case,
be unwieldy, simply adding another layer of bureaucracy to existing agencies and groups, most of
whom will oppose any attempts at coordination that diminishes their influence; and (3) that most LDCs
will oppose any new body which may pressure them to conform to higher environmental norms or
standards or risk reduced access to Northern markets.  Together, these three claims pose serious
challenges to a GEO, requiring that any successful argument in its favor demonstrate (1) that existing
arrangements are not in fact adequate and that coordination may not imply centralization; (2) that a
GEO can be implemented in a way which accommodates existing institutional arrangements; (3) that
LDC suspicions and reservations can be overcome.  
A final reservation, somewhat external to the question of a GEO per se, concerns the prospects
for a new MTN round.  In the year or more since the breakdown of talks in Seattle in December,
1999, forward progress has been scant, although various working groups and WTO committees
continue to meet.  In part, this is the result of various election cycles, especially in the U.S.  It is clear55Elizabeth Olson. “Regional Trade Pacts Thrive as the Big Players Fail to Act.” New York
Times Dec. 28, 2000. p. W1.
56Edward Alden, “Bush Faces Huge Trade Divide.”  Financial Times January 3, 2001, p. 5.
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that the new U.S. administration will support renewed efforts at liberalization, and will have different
priorities and approaches than its predecessor.  Rewriting and recasting a script for a new trade round
will take time, and Congress must be prepared to extend fast-track authority.  Meanwhile, other trading
blocs and nations are showing increasing irritation with the U.S. and E.U.s’ handling of the liberalization
process.  Countries in Asia, for example, are moving to rebuild their economies through numerous
bilateral and plurilateral trade pacts, and Latin economies are not far behind.  In 1990, there were 50
regional trade groupings compared with 200 today, and 70 are under discussion.55
It is far from clear how a GEO, and “green trade” issues generally, might fit into a new round,
and whether enthusiasm for them will be found in the new U.S. administration or among developing
countries.  Especially unless LDC interests and concerns can be confronted realistically and fully, and
real commitments made to them for greater market access, whatever progress might occur toward a
GEO may result from bilateral or regional commitments rather than a multilateral deal.  Even here, the
prospects seem dim.  Although President Bush has signaled a desire to move rapidly toward a
hemispheric U.S. free trade agreement at the April, 2001 summit in Quebec City, the Latin countries
have been among the most vocal opponents of environmental or labor conditions attached to such
accords.56  The probability that bilateral or regional agreements will lead to a GEO thus seems remote.
An alternative model, suggested by a recent bilateral deal, is the U.S. free trade agreement with
Jordan, which incorporates labor and environmental provisions in the main text, but essentially calls on57Sherman Katz. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC, personal
communication. December, 10, 2001.
58Quoted in Edward Alden. “Bush Faces Huge Trade Divide.” Financial Times. January 3,
2001, p. 5.
59Steve Charnovitz.  “Environmental Harmonization and Trade Policy.” In Durwent Zaelke
(ed.) Trade and the Environment: Law, Policy and Economics. Washington, DC: Island Press,
1993.  A more fully developed comparison of a GEO and the ILO is contained in Frank Biermann. 
“The Case for a World Environment Organization.” Environment 42: 9 (November, 2000): 23-31.
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both parties to observe and enforce their own national environmental norms and standards.57  The
“Jordan model” was proposed for prospective U.S. agreements with Singapore and Chile late in the
Clinton Administration.  However, these proposals prompted a harshly worded letter from the
Republican leadership to the White House in December, 2000, warning that internalizing labor and
environmental provisions in bilateral trade deals “will severely undermine the ability of the next president
to craft a bipartisan trade program.”58
In one respect, however, opposition to the “Jordan model” may actually improve the prospects
for a separate entity such as a GEO.  Charnovitz’ has compared a GEO to an expanded and
strengthened International Labor Organization (ILO).  As suggested in previous sections, like the ILO,
a GEO might be organized to reflect business, environmental and governmental representation.59 
Echoing this idea, some Republicans have recently argued that business might favor externalizing
environmental issues in a manner similar to ILO’s treatment of labor disputes.  The essential question is
whether such an approach, in which environmental issues are linked, but separate, necessarily implies
the creation of a body such as the GEO, at the same level as the ILO.60UNEP has recently been reorganized under its executive director, Klaus Töpfer, former
German environment minister.  Even so, its weakness have led other international bodies such as the
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) to initiate their own environmental programs.  As Biermann (2000, p. 25)
observes, “it remains to be seen whether this incrementalism in strengthening UNEP will deliver the
necessary results in the future or whether more fundamental reforms are needed.”
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5. Issues of Implementation
It is clear that the creation of a GEO would pose difficult issues of implementation.  Among
them: (1) What duties of existing bodies would be assumed by a GEO, and what would these bodies
then do? (2) What new responsibilities would be assigned to a GEO by its members, and by whom
would these duties be performed? (3) What would be the relationship between a GEO and the WTO? 
While no definitive answers can be given to these complex legal and administrative questions in a paper
of this length, some general comments are in order.
First, as suggested in section two, it is probable that a GEO would assume some of the
responsibilities of UNEP and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD).  This is in part, Esty
(2000) argues, because the UNEP as a program agency “tries to do too much.”60 The CSD is similarly
overstretched.  In addition, there are responsibilities of the UNDP and the World Bank related to
environment and development in which the GEO might assist, assuming development projects remained
the province of these groups.  The GEO could, for example, assist in the planning of expanded irrigation
schemes involving interbasin and/or international transfers of water so as to minimize environmental
disruptions.  A major function of the GEO would be to provide a transparent source of information on
global environmental issues, assisting what is now often the task of NGOs.  As currently arranged, Esty
(1999, p. 1564) notes that someone attempting to track environmental decisions at the WTO “would61Daniel C. Esty. “Toward Optimal Environmental Governance.” New York University Law
Review 74: 6 (Dec. 1999): 1495-1574.  Indeed, the total budget resources devoted to these efforts by
NGOs considerably exceed those of sub-agencies in UNEP responsible for environmental information. 
Shaffer (2001, p. 32 n. 97) notes that Greenpeace’s annual income in 1998 was 125 million dollars,
and that of the World Wildlife Fund was 53 million dollars.
62See Esty, 1994, p. 96.
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find out a great deal more by reading newsletters from the World Wildlife Fund then communiques from
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.”61  Although groups such as UNEP and even some NGOs
might feel threatened by a GEO, it is probable that enough work will remain to keep every group fully
engaged in international environmental affairs.  However, to the extent that budgetary resources are
drawn off existing agencies and programs to support a GEO, internecine competition will be intense.  
The new responsibilities assigned a GEO are of special importance in developing a rationale for
its creation.  As noted above, one of these would be to offer a “chapeau” for the growing number of
MEAs, especially in the context of dispute settlement.  While it can be argued that each MEA responds
to different needs and constituencies, there is a strong argument for coordinating many of these efforts. 
This does not imply any necessary changes in the MEAs, or in the lines of authority stretching back to
national governments.  One analogy is the role played (since 1967) by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), headquartered in Geneva.  The WIPO was established in part to help unsnarl
the “treaty congestion” that surrounded intellectual property and patent rights, and to help rationalize
and coordinate these efforts.62  
It is also arguable that a GEO would help to offset the perception in LDCs that MEAs and
exceptions granted to WTO contracting parties under GATT Article XX or other headings are heavily
tilted in the direction of the Northern states. The Indian NGO Centre for Science and the Environment,63Quoted in Shaffer, 2001, p. 36.  Biermann (2000, p. 25-26) argues that improving
technology transfers to developing countries for environmental improvements could be a major GEO
function.
64Quoted in Shaffer, note 132, p. 47.
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for example, has “characterized the use of trade measures in MEAs as an inequitable lever available
only to stronger countries.”63  As noted above, so long as this perception continues, Southern countries
will remain skeptical of global environmental initiatives.  Yet a GEO may be precisely the mechanism
needed to give added weight to these Southern concerns.
One of the most pressing and unmet needs to which a GEO could contribute is preparation and
technical support available to developing countries in the formulation of trade, development and
environmental initiatives.  If a GEO is to succeed, it must treat these needs as of paramount importance. 
In particular, a GEO should take as its responsibility the implementation of the primary principles
emerging from the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (ostensibly the current
responsibility of the Commission on Sustainable Development):
• that developing and developed countries have differing responsibilities to enact
domestic measures to protect the environment;
• that international transfers are necessary to assist developing countries to upgrade their
environmental protection measures;
• that unilateral measures are to be avoided.64
In the context of a GEO, these three principles imply: (1) That a form of “special and differential
treatment” in environmental policies is to be expected as part of an international body of multilateral
environmental rules, in which the differing capacities of the North and South to mount programs of65Budget of the U.S. Govt., Fiscal year 2001. http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/
pdf/budget.pdf.
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environmental protection are realistically acknowledged.  (2) That the resources to undertake
environmental programs are substantial (the estimated 2000 budget authority of the U.S. EPA ($7.6
billion), Interior ($8.3 billion), USDA-Forest Service ($1.2 billion), USDA-Fish and Wildlife ($715
million), USDA-Natural Resources Conservation ($661 million) and NOAA ($1.8 billion) together
total $20.6 billion.65  This may be compared with 1998 total GNP for Uruguay of $20 billion, Vietnam
of $26.5 billion, and Bangladesh of $44.2 billion.  This clearly implies the need for expanded technical
assistance through U.S. agencies such as AID.  But more important may be a recognized payoff to
LDCs willing to promote environmental protection in the form of expanded market access to developed
country markets.  This issue will be taken up in greater detail below.  (3) That just as unilateralism in
trade policy is ultimately self-defeating, so is it in environmental policy, at least where transborder issues
are concerned.  Naturally, a GEO would not require all national environmental measures to be
subjected to oversight, but where these measures affect the “global commons,” multilateralism should
provide a foundation principle. 
Finally, the GEO/WTO interface will be all-important.  Perhaps, paradoxically, if it is to take
environmental pressures off of the WTO, a GEO should be located in Geneva.  There, it could assist
the WTO (analogous again to WIPO), and would be situated to work in cooperation with the World
Health Organization (WHO) and the growing number of environmental NGOs who have found it useful
to use Geneva as a base.
A last set of implementation issues concerns timing and phasing.  It is very unlikely, given the35
problems and potential opposition facing a GEO, that it could be implemented in a single “grand
stroke.” Such an achievement would only be likely to emerge from a more general agreement to reform
and revitalize all of the major multilateral institutions: the World Bank, IMF, WTO and UN System, in a
single exercise analogous to the momentous post-war conferences of the late 1940s.  There seems little
current enthusiasm for such an effort.
A less ambitious, but still daunting, possibility would be to launch a GEO as part of some final
agreement in a new MTN round.  Such an outcome assumes that a new round can be successfully
launched and negotiated, with side-negotiations over a GEO contributing part of the final package.  This
will require general acceptance of the arguments in favor of a GEO, and overcoming the arguments and
factors weighing against it, notably those related to LDC interests.
A third approach, consistent with a new round of MTN talks, but not reliant upon them, would
be to open negations over a GEO as a multilateral environmental effort, linked to, but separate from,
MTN negotiations.  This would follow, in general form, the NAFTA side-agreement model and would
place GEO talks on a separate path.  A difference might be that while the NAAEC environmental side
agreement would surely not have succeeded had NAFTA failed, GEO talks might proceed and even
succeed without a successful MTN.  However, for a variety of reasons, related especially to market
access requirements of LDCs, this outcome also seems unlikely.
A fourth, scaled-down proposal would establish not a GEO, but a “Standing Conference on
Trade and Environment.”  This approach, advocated by UNCTAD’s Rubens Ricupero, would be an
expansion of the informal ad hoc sessions so far organized by the WTO Secretariat for delegates,
various international organizations and NGOs.  The result would be to create a body of interested66Shaffer (2001, notes 110 and 111) discusses the five NGO Symposia held by the WTO, and
discusses Ricupero’s proposal (note 136).  See Rubens Ricupero. “UN Reform: Balancing the WTO
with a Proposed ‘World Environment Organization” in Policing the Global Economy, 2000.
67Biermann offers three “models” for a GEO: a cooporation model, a centralization model and a
hierarchization model.  The cooperation model would essentially retain all existing bodies in their current
state, but would elevate UNEP to a leading and coordinating role, becoming in effect a GEO.  The
centralization model would grant greater authority to a central institutional actor (again probably UNEP)
to oversee and direct the environmental activities of other UN bodies.  This model would make the
GEO similar to the WTO, and would bring MEAs into a reporting relationship with the GEO.  This
GEO would have a double-weighted voting procedure in which decisions would require a two-thirds
majority of both developed and developing countries.  The hierarchization model would grant the GEO
enforcement authority like the Security Council, and would constitute the most dirigiste of the
alternatives–approaching a global government.  Of the three alternatives, a hybrid of the first two,
“cooperation” and “centralization” is closest in spirit to that discussed here.  One might call this hybrid
the “coordination model.”  See Frank Biermann. “The Case for a World Environment Organization.”
Environment 42: 9 (November, 2000): 23-31.
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parties which might, over time, evolve into a more formal negotiating group.66  
Sampson (2000, p. 140-141) in somewhat the same spirit, has advocated the use of an
“eminent persons group,” for trade and environment issues on the model of the Leutwiler Group in the
run-up to the Uruguay Round.  In addition, he has suggested that a new MTN negotiation might include
sub-negotiating groups similar to the GATT Articles subgroup and the Functioning of the GATT System
(FOGS) subgroup during the Uruguay Round.  The GATT Articles type of subgroups would
reconsider the exceptions under Article XX, while the FOGS subgroup would contemplate linkages
from the WTO to various environmental agreements.  It is notable that no where in his recent treatment
of trade/environment linkages does Sampson mention a GEO.67
6. Three Issues: LCDs, Subsidiarity and Conditionality
Considerable attention has already been given to the role and interests of LDCs in successfully68The IMF reports that in 1993, the U.S. share of world exports was 15.7 percent, E.U. 34.7
percent, and the rest of the world 49.6 percent.  In 1999, the United States’ share was 17.7 percent,
the E.U. 38 percent and the rest of the world 44.3 percent.
69The Economist.  “A Different, New World Order.”357: 8196 (November 12, 2000): 83-84;
89.
70See J. Michael Finger and Philip Schaler. “Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitment:
The Development Challenge.”  The World Economy 23: 4 (April, 2000): 511-525.  Rubens Ricupero.
“A Development Round: Converting Rhetoric into Substance.” Background note to the Conference on
Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium.  John F. Kennedy
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negotiating a GEO.  Yet it is critical to understand that as a group, the developing countries feel left out
of the many rewards promised in return for their support of a Uruguay Round Agreement.  Since the
completion of the round in 1994, global trade has risen significantly faster than GDP, but the share of
LDC exports has fallen relative to those of the U.S. and E.U.68  While this is partly a function of relative
growth rates, protectionist subsidies and price-supports have grown along with GDP, leaving many
developing countries feeling short-changed.  As the Economist recently noted, the failure of the Seattle
trade talks was due not to the presence of disgruntled demonstrators, so much as to “a failure of the
self-appointed vanguard of America and Europe to respond to the concerns of developing countries.”69
These concerns go beyond environmental measures, but tend to reinforce LDCs suspicions that
such measures are yet another excuse to restrict market access.  It is expanded market access, above
all else, which constitutes their main preoccupation.  Brazil has made a market access agreement in
agriculture a precondition to its involvement in a new round.  India has agreed that commitments it made
on intellectual property rights have not been matched by the expanded market access in agriculture and
textiles which it expected to ensue.  This was, after all, to have been the “Development Round” of
MTN talks.70  School of Government.  Harvard University. June 1-2, 2000.
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Given this state of affairs, a GEO can only succeed if it is linked to a larger set of real
expansions in market access opportunities for LDCs.  Like NAFTA and its side-agreements, this is in
part because such linkage offers the only prize sufficient to induce LDCs to take a GEO seriously. 
Second, such linkage will tend to undercut the suspicion that a GEO is a protectionist Trojan Horse. 
Third, it will underscore the obvious need for economic growth and expansion if LDCs are to make the
many investments required to protect their environments.
Notwithstanding such a need for linkage, there is no reason that negotiations over a GEO
could not be separated from the formal MTN talks, in the same manner as the NAFTA side-
agreements.  This would allow the MTN talks to proceed without the threat posed by the length and
complexity of GEO discussions.  In general, such a view argues against the “Jordan model,” in which
environmental commitments are internalized in larger trade agreements.
In one respect, however, the “Jordan model” is of special relevance to LDCs interest in a GEO. 
By treating the separate environmental goals of Jordan and the U.S. as mutually acceptable, the bilateral
accord was endorsing what the E.U. terms “subsidiarity”: in effect, environmental policy should be
conducted by sovereign states at an appropriate level of competency and jurisdiction.  In the context of
LDC interests, subsidiarity must also recognize the differential capacity of lower-income countries to
undertake expensive environmental programs.  Hence, subsidiarity is closely tied to special and
differential treatment of LDCs in the conduct and performance of environmental programs.  By
emphasizing these special and differential circumstances in relation to environmental policy, a GEO71See Robert Hudec. Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern
GATT Legal System.  Salem, NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993.  In the case of environmental
obligations and sanctions, see Scott Barrett. Environmental and Statecraft. Forthcoming.  In a 1997
theoretical article, Barrett argues that the existence of trade sanctions in environmental agreements may
nudge countries towards compliance, so long as a sufficient number of countries are committed to their
enforcement.  See Scott Barrett, “The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental
Agreements.” Resource and Energy Economics 19 (1997): 345-361.
72Steve Charnovitz, personal communication.  January 10, 2001. See Steve Charnovitz.
“Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions.” A Paper at the Conference, The Political Economy of
International Trade.  University of Minnesota, September 15-16, 2000.  For a review of different types
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would help to build support for added technical assistance for environmental improvements. 
Unfortunately, a key area in which the Jordan model, and subsidiarity generally, fails is in cases of
obvious transboundary or public goods problems.  Such transboundary issues affecting the U.S. and
Jordan are very small in number, but this would not be true of a multilateral undertaking such as a GEO.
A last, and especially thorny, issue concerns the potential role of a GEO as an imposer of
sanctions and conditionality on countries unwilling or unable to comply with norms or standards.  This
is, of course, an old and contentious issue in trade policy.71  Most multilateral agreements, including a
GEO and its rules, are likely to carry penalties for noncompliance.  However, there is no reason in the
case of a GEO why such penalties need to take the form of trade sanctions, as opposed to fines, denial
of voting rights, or other measures “decoupled” from trade itself.  This argument can be employed in
order to separate environment from trade measures, reducing the potential use (and abuse) of trade
sanctions to enforce multilateral environmental compliance.
The experience of sanctions in trade policy suggests that they are far less important to the
maintenance of world trade rules than the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO, which are in turn
modeled on those established in 1919 by the ILO.72  If a GEO were to come into being, theof carrots and sticks, see the appendix in Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade , Environment
and the Future (1994) and Howard Chang.  “Carrots, Sticks and International Externalities.” 
International Review of Law and Economics 17:3 (September 1997): 309-24.  For a broader
assessment of compliance issues see A. Chayes and A. Chayes. The New Sovereignty Compliance
with International Regulation Agreements. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
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opportunity to create a separate environmental dispute resolution process might be of special help in
separating multilateral environmental issues from those of trade.  Such a process could function as a
conduit for disputes under the many MEAs or bilateral environmental agreements (including regional
agreements such as NAAEC) so that ad hoc dispute resolution mechanisms for each such agreement
could be consolidated.  In addition, such a process would allow NGOs to enter disputes as “friends of
the court.”  While not a formal sanction, the capacity of NGOs to focus international attention on
countries found to have violated environmental norms might have important impacts on compliance.
7. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has attempted to deal with some of the many issues surrounding proposals for a
Global Environment Organization (GEO).  Its purpose was to help frame discussion, and it makes no
claim to have covered all of the possible issues involved.  After a brief historical discussion of the
genesis of the GEO idea, and one view of its possible structure, it offered the main arguments, pro and
con.  It then considered issues of implementation, especially phasing and timing in relation to a renewed
round of MTN negotiations.  This was followed by a brief overview of the important problems facing
LDCs, together with related questions of subsidiarity, sanctions, and conditionality.
Despite the necessary limits of this analysis, a number of conclusions emerge.  The first is that a41
GEO holds opportunities for both the trading system and the global environment.  To the trading
system, it offers the opportunity to disentangle trade from environmental matters, allowing the WTO to
focus where it should: on expansion of market access and reductions in trade protectionism, saving
attention for environmental measures only in cases of obvious trade distortion.  A GEO could be of
considerable assistance to the WTO in clarifying where environmental exceptions to the GATT articles
were justified (under Article XX or other headings) and providing guidelines for minimally trade-
distorting MEAs.  At the same time, a GEO could help fill the institutional gap in dispute resolution and
coordination surrounding the many MEAs and institutions now responsible for global environmental
issues, especially UNDP, the CSD and certain activities of the World Bank, UNDP, WHO, WMO,
FAO, among others.  This coordination need not imply centralization, nor the usurpation of authority
from these bodies or national governments.
Second, a GEO could channel needed attention to a wide range of global public goods and
global commons issues–from ozone depletion to biodiversity to air and water pollution to overfishing. 
These issues are arguably in need of greater focus and attention independent of the trading system,
suggesting a need for separate multilateral instruments such as a GEO.
Third, overcoming opposition to a GEO will require a two-fold undertaking involving the
politics and posture of both developed and developing countries.  In the North, opposition to
multilateral institutions generally–arising from both Right and Left–must change.  Conservatives will need
to overcome their distrust of global environmental initiatives.  The environmental left, meanwhile, must
overcome its strident opposition to all things multinational.  In developing countries, environmental
improvements are an urgent need, which can now be deflected by claims that environmental issues are42
rich men’s concerns.  Unless a GEO clearly offers specific commitments to special and differential
treatment of LDC problems, expanded technical assistance, and ample LDC representation, it will be
easily discredited as a form of environmental conditionality and a disguised mechanism of Northern
protectionism.
Fourth, it is unlikely that LDCs will find a GEO attractive unless it is linked to commitments for
expanded market access, especially in key areas such as agriculture and textiles.  This suggests a model
in which a GEO is linked to but separate from a new round of MNT negotiations.  The virtue of
linkage is that LDCs will see that market access will enable them seriously to contemplate
environmental improvements in the context of economic growth.  The virtue of separation is that a
successful MTN negotiation will not have to internalize questions of multilateral environmental policy.
The overall conclusion is that despite serious hurdles, a GEO can be envisioned which is both
pro-trade and pro-environment, strengthening the global trading system, and its rules, while carving out
new areas of international environmental competency.  Achieving this vision will be difficult, but it is this






























Figure 1: Structure of a Global Environment Organization (GEO) (adapted from Runge, 1994).44
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